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ABSTRACT 
In this paper we evaluate whether government intervention through the public funding of 
business angel networks is warranted. Based on a regional study of four BANs, we find that 
these subsidies reach their goals in terms of contribution to economic development and 
reducing financing and information problems entrepreneurial companies face. However, they 
are partly based on the wrong assumptions as these companies are not (yet) value creating. 
Therefore, we advise caution in using the market failure argument as grounds for government 
intervention in the informal risk capital market. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Over the past decade, governments from all over the world have launched initiatives to 
stimulate risk capital markets (LERNER, 1999; EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2003b), 
ranging from public venture capital (VC) and seed funds to co-funding of private VC funds, 
supporting business angel networks (BANs), incubation services and developing guarantee 
schemes (OECD, 1997; EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2006). Risk capital refers to external 
equity financing of entrepreneurial companies and encompasses both formal venture capital 
(VC) and business angel (BA) investments or informal risk capital (EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION, 2001). Formal VC is provided by institutional, professional funds, while 
informal risk capital is provided by private, non-institutional investors whom have no family 
or friend connection with their investees (HARRISON and MASON, 1999; EVCA, 2002).  
The rationale for government intervention in the risk capital market mainly stems from 
the widespread belief, both among academics and policy makers, that risk capital promotes 
innovation, economic growth and job creation (FLORIDA and KENNEY, 1988; EVCA, 
2002; ALEMANY and MARTI, 2005), but that there is a market failure in the private market 
for risk capital for entrepreneurial firms (EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2003b). Market 
failure entails that entrepreneurial companies are not able to raise sufficient funding to carry 
out their value-creating investment opportunities. The goal of this study is to evaluate 
government intervention in the informal risk capital market through the public funding of 
BANs in Flanders, a Belgian region. We assess whether this intervention is warranted by 
evaluating whether it is based on the right assumptions and has achieved its goals. 
Corroborating the importance of the informal risk capital market, it is estimated that 
227,000 U.S. BAs invested $23.1 billion in 49,500 companies in 2005 (SOHL, 2005). This 
compares to $21.7 billion invested by U.S. VC funds in only 2,939 companies in 2005 
(PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS et al., 2006).  There is a scarcity of statistics on European 
BA investments. Estimates for the UK market amount to £0.5 billion to £1 billion invested per 
year in 3,000 to 6,000 companies, by 20,000 to 40,000 angels. The number of start-ups backed 
by angel investors is estimated to be 8 times the number of VC-backed start-ups in the UK 
(MASON, 2006).  
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GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION IN THE INFORMAL RISK CAPITAL MARKET 
Government intervention in the informal risk capital market is based on a market 
failure argument (EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2003b), caused by R&D externalities and 
information problems (BERGER and UDELL, 1998; MURRAY, 2007). We will first discuss 
R&D externalities and thereafter information problems.  
R&D externalities or spillovers refer to the fact that R&D investments within a 
company may entail private and social returns that benefit parties outside the company 
(LERNER, 1999). R&D investments can, for example, benefit competitors. This phenomenon 
is especially relevant for high-tech companies and increases the perceived risk and uncertainty 
surrounding these companies (MURRAY, 2007). Considering the high perceived risks 
inherent to high potential companies, potential investors want to appropriate all abnormal 
returns generated by these companies (MURRAY, 2007). Due to R&D externalities this, 
however, might not be possible and hence may lead investors to provide less financing than 
would be socially optimal (MURRAY, 2007). Small firms might be especially prone to this 
problem due to “their lesser market power and inability to finance the aggressive defence of 
intellectual ownership infringements” (MURRAY, 2007, p. 14).  
One of the factors contributing to the high perceived risk associated with 
entrepreneurial companies and a second source of market failure is the high level of 
information asymmetry, causing high uncertainty on the side of potential investors. As these 
companies generally do not have a track record, do not generate profits yet and do not dispose 
of considerable tangible assets, they are constrained from access to public capital markets and 
bank financing. Therefore, in addition to internally generated cash flows, they have to rely on 
informal or formal risk capital (BERGER and UDELL, 1998). Risk capital thus often presents 
the only external financing source available to value-creating entrepreneurial companies. Both 
VCs and BAs usually mitigate adverse selection and moral hazard risks caused by information 
asymmetries through extensive due diligence pre-investment, writing extensive contracts at 
investment and monitoring post-investment (BERGER and UDELL, 1998). However, due to 
scale economies in these processes and in order to further reduce risk, VCs have shifted their 
focus toward larger and older investments (LOCKETT et al., 2002; EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION, 2003a). Furthermore, VC investments tend to be spatially concentrated and 
focused on a few industries (LERNER, 2002; MASON and HARRISON, 2003).  
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Hence, it is argued that more and more small and young ventures, especially those 
active in regions or industries with a low supply of VC, have difficulties in raising sufficient 
VC even if they have value-creating investment opportunities, and hence have to resort to BA 
funding.  
Another information problem these companies face is the lack of transparency in the 
informal risk capital market. Entrepreneurs are not always fully informed about the array of 
possible financing sources and their characteristics (VAN AUKEN, 2001). Even if they 
understand BA financing, they are not always able to locate appropriate BAs, as the latter 
often do not want to make their investment intentions public. In the same vein, BAs have 
trouble in locating valuable investment opportunities (MASON and HARRISON, 2002). In 
other words, even if BAs would be willing to invest in early-stage companies, they are not 
always able to as they are not always able to find these companies. These problems are at the 
basis of the creation of BANs, that provide an information channel between entrepreneurs and 
BAs, without giving up the anonymity of the latter (HARRISON and MASON, 1996b). 
Conclusive evidence concerning the existence of a market failure is currently lacking 
(MAULA and MURRAY, 2003; JÄÄSKELÄINEN et al., 2006). Despite aforementioned 
arguments, some authors argue that the lack of financing for entrepreneurial companies is due 
more to the poor quality of the demand or lack of investment-readiness of entrepreneurs than 
it is to the unavailability of capital (e.g. MASON and HARRISON, 2002; 2003) and thus 
merely represents an efficiently operating market. The lack of financing per se is thus not 
enough to constitute a market failure; the financing constraint has to regard value-creating 
companies.  
 
REGIONAL APPROACH TO INFORMAL RISK CAPITAL: THE CASE OF 
BUSINESS ANGEL NETWORKS 
 
Increasingly, governments have realised the importance of a regional approach to 
reduce the perceived failure in the risk capital market (EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2006), 
given that the subsidiarity principle implies that policy is implemented at the lowest level 
possible, on the condition that it is still efficient (SUNLEY et al., 2005). Regional risk capital 
programmes are more efficient as geographic proximity is important in the early-stage 
investor-investee relationship. Matching demands facial contact between investor and investee 
in order to reduce information asymmetries and create trust (EBAN, 1998; AERNOUDT, 
1999).  
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Proximity further facilitates active coaching and advising, allowing companies to 
benefit more from the investor’s network and effort (MASON and HARRISON, 1995; 
SUNLEY et al., 2005). Regional initiatives may also be warranted to address specific regional 
market failures or equity gaps (SUNLEY et al., 2005). 
One regional measure aimed at facilitating early-stage funding, which has spread 
throughout Europe since the late nineties, is the public funding and support of BANs. Based 
on the evaluation of the potential of establishing regional BANs in Europe and the positive 
results in terms of cost-effectiveness of a pioneer program in the U.K., the Commission 
stimulated, facilitated and financed the establishment of BANs (EBAN, 1998; HARRISON 
and MASON, 1999). In the absence of an organised marketplace, BAs and entrepreneurs 
seeking finance have to rely on their personal network to find, respectively, investment 
opportunities and financing sources (AERNOUDT et al., 2007). While BAs complain that 
they do not find enough business plans to invest in (HARRISON and MASON, 1999), 
entrepreneurs are often unable to locate BAs. Hence, the main goal of BANs is to provide a 
communication channel between investors and entrepreneurs and, thus, reduce the failure in 
the informal risk capital market by reducing information problems. Other measures taken to 
stimulate the informal risk capital market, such as tax incentives, legislative measures, 
education of both BAs and entrepreneurs and co-investment schemes, cannot work effectively 
without first reducing these problems (MASON, 2006).  
Europe counted 231 BANs in 2005, of which an estimated 68% were publicly funded 
(EBAN, 2005a;b). Mason and Harrison (1995) consider the underwriting of the BANs’ 
operational costs by regional public authorities to be the most cost-effective measure to 
overcome the informal risk capital market failure. It was initially assumed that public 
subsidies were needed to launch BANs, but that they could become self-supporting after three 
to five years thanks to revenues from membership fees, success fees or sponsoring 
(HARRISON and MASON, 1996a; VAN ROMPUY, 1999). This assumption is, however, not 
confirmed (HARRISON and MASON, 1996a). Governments are now confronted with the 
question whether subsidies have to cease as initially foreseen - which would result in most 
BANs closing down -, or whether long-lasting structural subsidies are justified to maintain the 
BANs. A critical evaluation of BAN subsidies is hence timely. 
The relative success of BANs has been both widely endorsed and strongly contended, 
but there is no agreement on their effectiveness (HARRISON and MASON, 1996a;b; 
MASON and HARRISON, 2002).  
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The only BAN evaluation study to our knowledge to date, representing our only 
benchmark, has been the work of Harrison and Mason (1996a;b). In order to advance their 
work and make a thorough evaluation of the cost-effectiveness of public intervention in 
supporting BANs, we evaluate the support of BANs in Flanders (a Belgian region) from 1999 
to 2004. We explain this government initiative in more detail below. 
 
PUBLIC FUNDING OF BA NETWORKS IN FLANDERS 
In 1999, the Flemish government decided to subsidize the first Belgian BAN, Vlerick 
BAN. Three other BANs were subsequently founded and subsidized, being Bizzbees, 
Limburg BAN and Flanders Business Netwerk. These four BANs were the only BANs 
operating in Flanders from 1999 to 2004. The Flemish government, following the European 
Commission’s rationales, considered the BANs as a way to reduce the financing problems 
entrepreneurial companies face, through reducing information problems (VAN ROMPUY, 
1999). The financing of the networks was considered as one way to promote entrepreneurship 
and innovation in Flanders (VAN ROMPUY, 1999). The four Flemish BANs ceased to exist 
as independent organisations in 2004. Under the impulse of the Flemish government, they 
merged into one large regional BAN (BAN Vlaanderen) in order to create economies of scale, 
with five sub-regional offices. 
Together, these four BANs represented 140 BAs1 and 58 deals in 55 different 
companies, in which 54 different BAs invested between 1999 and 2004. The total amount of 
subsidies granted to the four BANs between 1999 and 2004 was €856,741, representing 50% 
of their costs. The subsidy per deal was hence €14,800 or 21% lower than the €18,900 per 
deal for the British Department of Trade and Industry’s (DTI) informal investment 
demonstration projects (HARRISON and MASON, 1996b).  
Evaluating public funding of BANs within one region has advantages. The four BANs 
all operate within the same economic, legislative and fiscal environment, increasing the 
internal validity of the evaluation. The external validity of the study is nevertheless warranted, 
as the subjects of our study are representative enough to extend the results of the study to 
other European regions. The Flemish BANs are similar to BANs in comparable European 
countries. A Flemish BAN closed, on average, 4.5 deals in 2003, compared to 0.2, 4.7 and 6 
deals per BAN in, respectively, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain. A Flemish BAN counted, on 
average, 35 BA members compared to 26 members in Germany, 35 in Italy and 45 in Spain 
(statistics based on EBAN, 2005a).  
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The informal risk capital market is, however, less mature in Continental Europe than 
in the U.S. and U.K. (EBAN, 2005a). For example, the U.K. counted 34 BANs in 2004, a 
number similar to the U.S., with an average of 5 deals per BAN (EBAN, 2005b). Furthering 
the argument of external validity, we note that Flanders is a region with 5 million inhabitants 
and thus fits into the criteria suggested for establishing a BAN (EBAN, 1998). Hence, its 
evaluation can present interesting conclusions for other European regions.  
 
HOW TO EVALUATE GOVERNMENT PROGRAMMES? 
According to Lerner and colleagues, the “starting point for any evaluation of a 
government programme is the goals it was designed to achieve” (LERNER et al., 2005, p. 
140). Most evaluation studies hence assess whether the objectives have been reached (e.g. 
HARRISON and MASON, 1996b; MURRAY, 1998; BOYNS et al., 2003; MAULA and 
MURRAY, 2003; AYAYI, 2004; LERNER et al., 2005). Through BAN subsidies, the 
Flemish government’s ultimate goal was to stimulate entrepreneurship, innovation and job 
creation in Flanders by reducing the perceived information and financing problems (sub-
goals) entrepreneurial companies face (VAN ROMPUY, 1999). The BANs’ mission was to 
create a market where entrepreneurs looking for finance and BAs looking for investments 
could find each other.  
One further needs to assess the assumptions the initiative and its objectives are based 
upon (MAULA and MURRAY, 2003). The assumption the Flemish government and the 
European Commission made when subsidising BANs was that there was a market failure. 
They assumed that there were entrepreneurial companies that suffered from financing 
problems and that these companies were value creating.  
Finally, in order to assess the full impact of a government programme, one needs to go 
beyond its direct effects (HARRISON and MASON, 1996b; LERNER, 1999). Hence, 
although hard to study and quantify, we will also discuss the potential indirect effects of the 
BAN subsidies. 
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Therefore, in order to exhaustively evaluate government funding of BANs, we need to 
answer following questions: 
 
1. Is there a failure in the informal risk capital market?  
a. Did the companies financed through BANs suffer from information problems 
and resulting financing constraints? 
b. Are these companies value-creating? 
2. Do BANs reduce the financing problems of entrepreneurial companies?  
3. Do these companies contribute to economic development?  
4. What are the indirect effects of the BAN subsidies? 
 
 
RESEARCH METHOD 
Researchers have generally used either one of two approaches to study foregoing 
questions. Some researchers relied on qualitative data by gathering general information on the 
government measures taken and/or by interviewing beneficiaries or experts (e.g. MURRAY, 
1998; DOSSANI and KENNEY, 2002; MAULA and MURRAY, 2003). Other researchers 
used quantitative data by comparing the performance of beneficiaries to that of comparable 
non-beneficiaries (e.g. LERNER, 1999; AYAYI, 2004).  A contribution of our study is that 
we combine both approaches, leading to a richer understanding and rigorous analysis of the 
research questions. 
We first solicited interviews from the beneficiaries, being all 55 entrepreneurs and 54 
BAs who were involved in a deal through one of the four Flemish BANs. This resulted in 28 
interviews with entrepreneurs (response rate of 51%) and 34 interviews with BAs (response 
rate of 63%). These interviews allow us to gain an insight into how market participants, i.e. 
the entrepreneurs looking for finance and the investors, perceive market failure in terms of 
information and financing problems and in the contribution of BANs in reducing this failure.  
As interviews provide subjective insights of market participants, we complement these 
with hard data, namely the financial accounts of all companies that received BA financing 
through one of the BANs (BAN-backed companies). We compare their financial situation 
prior to BA investment to that of a matched benchmark group of comparable non-BA-backed 
companies. We assess the financial risk of companies in both groups through traditional 
profitability, liquidity and leverage variables (e.g. ALTMAN, 1968; DEMERS and JOOS, 
2006).  
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In order for a market failure to exist, the financial situation of the BAN-backed 
companies should be substantially worse prior to BA investment than that of the non-BA-
backed companies. If not, the former should be able to access traditional financing sources, 
hence refuting a market failure argument. 
We conduct a second pre-investment comparison, this time to companies that did not 
resort to a BAN but nevertheless received BA financing through the entrepreneur’s personal 
network. This is relevant as one might argue that, in an efficient risk capital market, 
entrepreneurs with value-creating projects should be able to raise informal risk capital even 
without a BAN. First, having a poor personal network might be an indication of the inability 
of the entrepreneur to network with third parties that are relevant for conducting business, 
hence increasing the odds that the entrepreneur will not be able to develop the venture 
satisfactorily. Second, parties within an entrepreneur’s network face lower information 
asymmetries, as they are able to assess more fully potential agency problems with the 
entrepreneur. Failure to find a personally known party to invest might be an indication of 
excessive agency risk. Hence, entrepreneurs with a high ability and low agency risk should be 
able to find a BA without a BAN. If the above reasoning holds, we expect BAN-backed 
companies to perform worse compared to companies that found BA financing without 
resorting to a BAN. If, however, the performance of both groups of companies is the same, 
then this is additional evidence of market inefficiencies.  
Further, in order for a market failure to exist, companies facing financing constraints 
should have value-creating projects. In order to assess how “effectively and profitably” 
(MURRAY, 2007, p. 8) the BAN-backed companies employ their financing, we measure their 
return on assets (ROA) in the year of BA participation and two years thereafter, as a proxy for 
value creation. Ideally, we should compare ROA to the companies’ funding cost to assess 
value creation. As it is difficult to estimate the funding cost of unquoted companies, we 
compare the ROA of BAN-backed companies to both that of non-BA-backed companies and 
companies that found BA financing without having to resort to a BAN. Hence, we assume that 
these groups of companies have a comparable funding cost2. A second weakness of our 
approach is that we have to restrict our analysis to two years after the investment, due to data 
unavailability. Most deals occurred late in the subsidy period, in 2003 and 2004; we hence do 
not know how these companies will develop in the long run.  
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In order to assess whether BAN-backed companies contribute to economic 
development and growth, we study the absolute amount and growth in employment and value-
added – as a proxy for sales - (LERNER, 1999; EVCA, 2002) and the federal taxes paid by 
the BAN-backed companies (BOTAZZI and DA RIN, 2002; EVCA, 2002). Value-added is 
calculated as the difference between operating income and the value of inputs. Growth is 
calculated as the average yearly growth from the year of BA investment to the last available 
year (HEIRMAN and CLARYSSE, 2005). This growth measure has its limitations as it 
assumes a linear growth process. Furthermore, a long-term growth measure would be more 
desirable (LERNER, 1999), however, data unavailability does not permit us to calculate such 
a measure.  
The population of BAN-backed companies is identified based on the complete deal list 
of the four Flemish BANs. The sample of companies that received BA financing through 
another channel is based on two sources, namely (i) the interviews with the BAs who have 
invested through a BAN and were asked to give the identification details of all their BA 
investments, (ii) a database with all the financing sources of 221 Flemish high-tech start-ups 
(HEIRMAN and CLARYSSE, 2005). After removing overlaps between data sources and 
companies that we could not further identify, we retained 44 BAN-backed companies and 66 
BA-backed companies that found a BA without a BAN.  The two samples were further 
reduced due to missing data (8 companies).  Finally, companies that received BA backing 
before 1992 and after August 2003 were removed.  The final samples consist of 34 BAN-
backed companies and 50 BA-backed companies that received BA financing through another 
channel. The companies in the quantitative samples closely match the profile of the 
companies represented in the qualitative sample in terms of industry and age at BA 
participation. 
In order to assess the marginal impact of a government programme, we need a sample 
of similar market participants that did not benefit from the government programme (LERNER 
et al., 2005). Hence we match the BAN-backed companies with non-BA-backed companies 
on age, industry and size (LERNER, 1999). Age is measured in the year prior to BA 
participation or the year of BA participation if the BA participated at start-up.  Second, we 
match the BAN-backed companies on industry based on the NACE-BEL codes (comparable 
to 3-digit SIC codes). Third, we match on size, proxied by total assets. There are no 
significant differences between the BAN-backed sample and the matched sample with regard 
to age and size3.   
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SAMPLE DESCRIPTION  
The 28 BAN-backed companies, whose entrepreneurs were interviewed, have 
following characteristics.  The BA participated within the first two years after incorporation in 
15 out of the 28 companies. Each company has, on average, received €236,571 from BAN 
investors. If extrapolated, this would amount to €13,0 million BA money invested through a 
BAN or €15.19 per Euro of government money spent on the BANs. The Flemish BAN 
investors invested €2,6 million per year, which is twice the amount invested by the U.K. BAs 
under the DTI initiative in the early nineties, €1,4 million per year (HARRISON and 
MASON, 1996b).  
The 34 interviewed BAs, representing 36 out of the 55 BAN-backed companies, have 
invested €11,7 million through a BAN or €324,489 per company.  Extrapolating this amount 
to all BAN-backed companies, we estimate that BAs invested €17,8 million through BANs, or 
€20.83 per Euro of government money spent4.  Furthermore, the 34 BAs have invested an 
additional €22,8 million in companies that did not go to a BAN or €519,055 per company5.  If 
we were to extrapolate this amount to the 54 BAs who invested through the BANs, this would 
come down to a total of €36,3 million. BAs’ attitudes, investment behaviour and demographic 
characteristics are consistent with those of BAs in other countries (e.g. WETZEL, 1987; 
PAUL et al., 2003), further supporting the external validity of our study. 
We first discuss the results related to the market failure assumption (research question 
1) and the ability of BANs to reduce financing problems (research question 2). Then we 
discuss the contribution to economic development (research question 3) and end with a brief 
discussion of the indirect effects (research question 4). 
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MARKET FAILURE: FINANCING AND INFORMATION PROBLEMS 
The qualitative and quantitative analyses suggest that financing and information 
problems exist in the informal risk capital market.  
Insert Table 1 About Here 
More particularly, BAN-backed companies perform significantly worse in terms of 
liquidity and profitability compared to non-BA-backed companies before the BA investment 
(Table 1, Panel A). Their financial risk is higher and therefore the probability of raising 
financing from traditional sources such as banks is lower. This is further corroborated by the 
high degree of leverage of BAN-backed companies: 96% of their assets is financed with debt. 
This compares to 82% for the non-BA-backed sample (although the difference is not 
statistically significant). The qualitative interviews provide further evidence for the financing 
constraint argument. When asked why they opted for BA financing, 63% of the entrepreneurs 
stated that there were no other options. To put this in perspective, only 5 entrepreneurs 
referred to BA’s expected involvement and value-added as a motive for looking for BA 
financing. Although 17 entrepreneurs stated that they had another investor or financing 
alternative in prospect at the time of BA investment, either banks or 3F (family, friends and 
fools) money, they always admitted that both options were less suitable compared to BA 
money. They were either reluctant to mix personal and business life or the stringent conditions 
that go along with bank financing were not optimal for the company. Quantitative and 
qualitative results hence support the existence of financing constraints for entrepreneurial 
companies: these companies could probably not have found (the total amount of) financing 
through other sources. 
We further find support for the supposed information problems in the informal risk 
capital market. Pre-investment, there are no major differences between BAN-backed 
companies and companies that received BA financing through another channel (Table 1, Panel 
A). Post-investment, the same holds - except for the degree of leverage two years after BA 
participation -, confirming the robustness of the pre-investment results. This lack of 
significant differences indicates that the performance of companies turning to BANs for 
financing is not worse than that of other BA-backed companies. In other words, BANs do not 
systematically attract the worst performing companies unable to find financing through other 
channels.  
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The only difference between the BAN-backed companies and the companies that 
found BAs through another channel is that the former experienced information problems in 
locating a BA. 71% of the interviewed entrepreneurs stated they approached a BAN as this 
was the only known way for them to get in contact with BAs. In addition, only 5 
entrepreneurs were confident that they would have found BA financing if the BANs had not 
existed.  
Likewise, the BAs stated that they would not have known the companies without the 
BANs in 82% of the deals, confirming information problems. If the BANs had not existed, the 
BAs would thus not have been able to invest €14,2 million. In other words, each Euro of 
government subsidies has generated €16.63 of BA money, which otherwise would not have 
been invested in these companies. As there is a possibility that the BAs would have found 
other companies to invest in, the €14,2 million invested through the BANs probably 
overestimates the marginal impact of the BANs. However, 74% of the BAs stated that they 
still had funds left for additional investments, which increases the probability that the major 
part of the €14,2 million invested can be attributed to the existence of the BANs. Taken 
together, qualitative and quantitative results consistently support the existence of information 
problems, both for BAs and entrepreneurs, and the positive role of BANs in reducing these 
problems by creating a marketplace that brings BAs and entrepreneurs together. Our study 
provides strong support for the assumption that the informal risk capital market is plagued by 
substantial information problems leading to financing constraints.  
 
MARKET FAILURE: VALUE CREATION 
The following step in our analysis is to investigate whether BAN-backed companies 
create value. If not, a failure to raise funds outside BANs is merely the outcome of efficient 
resource allocation. Funding should not be channelled to non-value-creating companies. Our 
results do not confirm the value-creating argument in the short term. Not only do BAN-
backed companies create significantly less value than similar non-BA-backed companies, they 
even destroy value (Table 1, Panel B). ROA is negative in the year of the BA investment and 
two years later, while it is significantly higher and positive for non-BA backed companies. 
Hence, BAN-backed companies do not invest in a cost-effective or profitable manner.  
16 
 
Further, this lack of (short-term) value creation is a general feature of BA-backed 
companies, whether they resort to a BAN or not. BAN-backed companies are again not 
different from companies that found a BA outside a BAN. 
In conclusion, although financing and information problems do plague entrepreneurial 
companies, we cannot label this as a market failure (yet) as the BA(N)-backed companies are 
value destroying in the short term. Therefore, caution is called for in using the market failure 
argument as grounds for defending government programmes in the informal risk capital 
market. We have to bear in mind though that, due to the fact that most BAN investments are 
recent, the data are restricted to a period of two years after the BA investment. It is possible 
that these companies need more time to deploy their capital in the most effective way 
(LERNER, 1999). Our short-term analyses may hence underestimate their long-term value 
creation.  
 
 
CONTRIBUTION TO ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
The ultimate goal of the Flemish government was to stimulate regional economic 
growth and development through subsidizing the four BANs (VAN ROMPUY, 1999). 
Important indicators of a contribution to economic development are job creation, taxes and 
value adding (LERNER, 1999; EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2001).  
Insert Table 2 About Here 
 
The BAN-backed companies together added €31,9 million in value, from the year of 
BA participation onwards, or, if extrapolated to all 55 BAN-backed companies, €51,6 million. 
In other words, we estimate that each Euro of government subsidies spent on the Flemish 
BANs generated €60.26 in value-added. The average yearly growth in value added amounts to 
€52,770 for BAN-backed companies. This is not significantly different from the growth in 
value added of non-BA-backed companies. BAN-backed companies hence do not perform 
better or worse than comparable non-BA-backed companies. 
urther, the BAN-backed companies paid €348,000 in taxes over a four-year period, 
starting from the year of BA participation. If extrapolated, this would come down to €526,941 
in taxes paid by all BAN-backed companies. We hence estimate that each Euro of government 
money spent on the BANs generated a direct return of €0.66 in taxes.  
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The BAN-backed companies pay significantly less taxes compared to the non-BA-
backed companies, which is not surprising considering their significantly worse performance.  
Finally, we calculate several measures for job creation by the BAN-backed companies. 
From the year of BA participation onwards up until the last available year, each BAN-backed 
company has created 1.84 jobs on average. If extrapolated, all BAN-backed companies 
together created 102 jobs (187 jobs created minus 85 jobs destroyed), representing a subsidy 
of €8,399 per job created. Extrapolated these companies represent 495 jobs in total. As there 
is a high probability that these companies would not have existed without the BANs due to 
financing constraints, the most positive view is to consider all 495 jobs as being additional. 
The subsidy per job created or retained is then €1,731. This is comparable to the cost of 
€1,515 per job created under the DTI initiative in the U.K. (HARRISON AND MASON, 
1996b). BAN-backed companies had an average yearly growth of 0.66 FTE, which is not 
different from employee growth in non-BA-backed companies.  
The Flemish government thus succeeds in stimulating economic development and 
growth through the subsidization of BANs. BAN-backed companies contribute as much as do 
companies that found BA financing without a BAN and do not contribute less or more than 
non-BA-backed companies in terms of value-added and job creation, but do pay somewhat 
less taxes.  
 
INDIRECT IMPACT OF THE BAN SUBSIDIES 
An exhaustive evaluation of a government initiative needs to go beyond its direct 
effects (HARRISON and MASON, 1996b; LERNER, 1999). In addition to bringing 
entrepreneurs and investors together, BANs may provide other benefits. The four main 
indirect effects are raising the awareness and legitimacy of BA financing, providing coaching 
and advice to both investors and entrepreneurs (which for the latter also entails feedback from 
potential investors), providing education to enhance investor readiness for both entrepreneurs 
and BAs and, finally, the possibility for the entrepreneurs to raise further financing thanks to 
the BA financing, both at the time of BA financing and later (HARRISON and MASON, 
1996a;b; LUMME et al., 1998). Although hard to quantify, we briefly discuss each of these 
impacts. 
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Due to the anonymity preference of BAs and the fact that entrepreneurs often have 
incomplete knowledge of the financing sources that they have at their disposal (VAN 
AUKEN, 2001; PAUL et al., 2003), raising the awareness of potential market participants is 
an important task of a BAN. Both interviewed entrepreneurs and BAs support the idea that the 
BANs have conducted a considerable awareness campaign towards potential investors and 
entrepreneurs with regard to the existence of BA financing and its characteristics. 
Furthermore, both parties considered this task to be important. 
Further, BANs have an advisory and educational role to play towards entrepreneurs 
and investors. They can help entrepreneurs on how to put together a business plan or how to 
present themselves to potential investors. If a BA is not the most appropriate source of 
funding, BANs can refer entrepreneurs to other, more suitable institutions such as banks or 
VCs. The feedback provided by the BAs themselves may also be important. Even if 
entrepreneurs do not find an interested or appropriate investor through a BAN, they might 
advance in their professional development based on feedback received from the BAs they 
talked to. Education and training is a related task. BANs often provide specialized courses to 
both investors and entrepreneurs such as negotiation, taxation or valuation courses. Based on 
our interviews, we found that, although BAs consider the BANs to do a rather good job when 
it comes to educating the entrepreneurs, they would advise them to do a better job in 
educating the BAs although they do not consider this to be an important task. The 
entrepreneurs praise the BANs even more when it comes to educating and informing market 
participants. 
A final side effect of BANs’ existence is the fact that BA funding might enable 
entrepreneurs to “unlock further finance” (HARRISON and MASON, 1996b, p. 768) and 
raise follow-on financing. The average BAN-backed company received €243,518 from BAs 
not connected to a BAN. Further, ten entrepreneurs succeeded in raising finance from other 
sources at the time of the BA investment. More particularly, four of them also received bank 
financing, four received government related financing (such as subsidies), one received 3F 
money, one VC financing and one money from other companies. The average amount these 
companies were able to raise from other sources is €233,313. Although somewhat less than 
the average amount unlocked by companies benefiting from the DTI initiative, i.e. €298,516 
(HARRISON and MASON, 1996b), this confirms the satisfactory performance of the Flemish 
subsidies.  
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Further, 61% of the entrepreneurs state that the financing they received from the BAs 
had a positive impact on their follow-on financing. Corroborating this statement, fourteen 
companies were able to raise follow-on bank financing, two companies VC financing and four 
other companies raised financing through other channels such as government subsidies. On 
average, these companies raised another €365,000 following BA financing. According to 
Harrison and Mason (1996b), one quarter of the companies should be able to attract at least 
50% of the original amount in terms of follow-on financing. In this sense, the Flemish BANs 
performed well as one quarter of the BAN-backed companies were able to raise 168% of the 
original amount. 
These qualitative and quantitative results support the statement that the Flemish 
BANs, in addition to positive direct effects, also create important positive indirect effects. 
 
CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 
The goal of this study is to evaluate whether government intervention in the informal 
risk capital market through BAN subsidization is warranted. We first assess whether the 
subsidies have reached their goals, namely reducing the financing problems value-creating 
entrepreneurial companies struggle with and, by doing so, stimulating economic development 
and growth. Second, we assess whether this intervention was based on the correct 
assumptions. Government intervention in the risk capital market has traditionally been based 
on the widespread belief of the existence of a market failure. Therefore, we evaluate whether 
there is a failure in the informal risk capital market, i.e. whether there are value-creating 
companies that face substantial financing problems, due to information problems or R&D 
spillovers. In order to make our evaluation as exhaustive as possible, we also assess the 
subsidies’ indirect effects. 
Based on quantitative and qualitative data, we find clear evidence of BANs reducing 
the information and financing problems the entrepreneurial companies face. Further, these 
companies do contribute to economic development and growth. In this sense, the Flemish 
subsidies are a success as they reached their goals. However, our results do not provide 
support for the market failure assumption. The BAN-backed companies have suffered from 
financing and information problems, but these companies are not (yet) value creating. Their 
pre-investment financing difficulties seem to be the result of an efficient market operation, 
which then refutes the grounds for government intervention.  
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On the upside, we note that the Flemish BAN initiative produced important indirect 
effects and, further, compares well to the UK’s DTI initiative, our only benchmark 
(HARRISON and MASON, 1996b). In conclusion we state that, despite the BAN subsidies’ 
positive direct and indirect effects, government intervention through BAN subsidization is 
partly based on the wrong assumptions and is therefore not entirely warranted. Nevertheless, 
in order to see whether BAN-backed companies are truly value creating, and thus 
governments do need to step in, a more long-term evaluation is indispensable. 
Our study of course has its limitations. First, we mainly focused on the subsidies’ 
direct effects. We gathered some information on the externalities associated with these 
subsidies, but this information is generally hard to quantify. In this respect, the impact of the 
government subsidies might be underestimated. Second, some positive outcomes, such as the 
gain in BA money invested due to the existence of a BAN, might be over-estimated. Third, 
one could argue that the correct comparison to make would be to compare publicly funded 
BANs with non-publicly funded ones. However, as none of the Flemish BANs would have 
existed without the subsidies, it is clear that these were instrumental in setting up and running 
the BANs. Moreover, there were (and still are) no BANs in Belgium operating without 
regional subsidies (EBAN, 2005a). As the ultimate goal of BAN subsidies is to reduce 
information and financing problems, not merely to run a BAN, we consider it more relevant to 
study the ultimate beneficiaries of the measure, being the companies and BAs involved. 
Finally, our study is limited to BANs in one region, Flanders. However, as mentioned before, 
we do not consider this to be an important threat to the external validity of our study. 
In addition to resolving the above-mentioned limitations, we have other suggestions 
for further research. First, as most BAN investments are rather young, we were only able to 
gather short-term post-investment data. In order to assess the value creation of BAN-backed 
companies, however, long-term analyses are essential. Further, with regard to the BAs’ 
involvement in and value-added for their portfolio companies, it would be interesting to make 
a performance comparison between the portfolio companies of more and less experienced 
BAs. Another interesting avenue for further research would be to compare companies that had 
financing alternatives prior to BA investment with those without. 
Despite its limitations, our study has several contributions. First, we contribute to the 
academic evaluation literature, as there is a scarcity of evaluations of government 
programmes. Furthermore, we contribute methodologically by combining quantitative and 
qualitative data. This provides the possibility to falsify qualitative statements made by the 
market participants.  
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Second, governments can benefit from this study as we show that moderation in using 
the market failure argument as grounds for intervention in the informal risk capital market is 
recommendable. Third, this is an interesting study for the BAs since it dispels the popular idea 
that BANs attract the worst-quality deals. It shows that BANs are a useful channel for 
increasing deal flow or for contacting investors. Finally, this study is useful to the BANs in 
that it confirms their role in reducing the information and thus financing problems in the 
informal risk capital market. Future research will, however, need to show whether the 
companies financed by the BANs are indeed worth it. 
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NOTES 
1: This number might be slightly over-estimated as we could only exclude double counting 
(due to being a member of multiple BANs) for BAs that made BAN investments. 
2: The fact that there is no significant difference in the degree of leverage between BAN-
backed and non-BA-backed companies up to two years after BA participation provides some 
support for this assumption. The same does not hold for the BA-backed companies that did 
not resort to a BAN for BA financing. The comparisons with the latter group thus need to be 
handled with caution. 
3: We conducted representativeness tests where possible. As we have no data on the 20 BAs 
who did not participate in this study, there is no way of knowing whether the 34 interviewed 
BAs are representative for the 54 BAs who have invested through one of the BANs. The 36 
companies they invested in are, however, representative for the 55 BAN-backed companies. 
These tests also hold when executed for the 28 interviewed BAN-backed companies and for 
the 34 BAN-backed companies that were withheld in the quantitative sample.  
4: This differs from the €15.19 mentioned before since there is no perfect overlap between the 
interviewed BAs’ investments and the interviewed companies. 
5: These amounts represent a lower limit since not all BAs were willing to provide these data. 
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TABLE 1:  
Test of the market failure argument 
 
 
 
*p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01 
(1) For the comparisons between BAN-backed and non-BA-backed companies, we used Wilcoxon 
rank tests 
(2) For the comparisons between BAN-backed and the other BA-backed companies, we used Mann-
Whitney tests 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable  
(in 000 EUR) 
BAN-backed 
compared to: 
(1) Non-BA-backed 
companies 
(2) BA-backed 
through another 
channel 
 
Mean St.Dev. N Mean St.Dev. N Mean St.Dev. N 
PANEL A: PRE-INVESTMENT COMPARISONS 
Return on assets (ROA) -0.36 0.47 21 -0.00*** 0.28 24 -0.28* 0.95 22 
Pre-tax profit -214.81 569.63 21 -3.83* 164.78 24 -36.41 96.98 22 
Operational profit -181.10 567.15 21 8.13** 166.92 24 -25.09 103.59 22 
Cash flow -96.52 445.21 21 35.68** 175.69 22 -3.36 97.57 22 
Total debt/total assets 
(%) 
0.96 0.60 21 0.82 0.34 24 0.81 0.56 22 
PANEL B: ANALYSIS OF POST-INVESTMENT VALUE CREATION 
ROA – Year 0 -0.45 0.54 26 0.09*** 0.20 29 -0.39 0.80 27 
ROA – Year 2 -1.58 5.04 21 0.08*** 0.27 24 -0.28 0.46 41 
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TABLE 2 
Evaluation of the contribution to economic development 
 
 
*p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01 
(1) For the comparisons between BAN-backed and non-BA-backed companies, we used Wilcoxon 
rank tests 
(2) For the comparisons between BAN-backed and the other BA-backed companies, we used Mann-
Whitney tests 
 
 
 
 
Variable  
(in 000 EUR) 
BAN-backed 
compared to: 
(1) Non-BA-backed 
companies 
(2) BA-backed through 
another channel 
 Mean St.Dev. N Mean St.Dev. N Mean St.Dev. N 
Taxes 
Year 0 4.20 7.80 10 23.14** 66.93 21 21.82 32.78 11 
Year 2 -1.17 4.17 6 27.11* 46.20 19 15.69 27.68 13 
Average yearly growth 
Value-added 52.77 153.01 28 5.67 173.23 30 151.04 399.72 45 
Employees (FTE) 0.66 1.66 19 0.11 1.60 13 2.99 8.64 42 
